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Abstract
We examine scal-monetary interactions in a New-Keynesian model with deep habits, distortionary taxes and
a sovereign risk premium for government debt. Deep habits crucially aect the scal transmission mechanism
in that these lead to a counter-cyclical mark-up, boosting the size of a demand-driven output expansion with
important consequences for monetary and scal policy. We employ Bayesian estimates of the model to compute
optimal monetary and scal policy rst in `normal times' with debt starting at its steady state and then in a
crisis period with a much higher initial debt-GDP ratio. Policy is conducted in terms of optimal commitment,
time consistent and simple Taylor-type rules. Welfare calculations and impulse responses indicate that the
ability of the simple rules to closely mimic the Ramsey optimal policy, observed in the literature with optimal
monetary policy alone, is still a feature of optimal policy with scal instruments, but only with `passive' scal
policy. For crisis management we nd some support for slow consolidation with a more active role for tax
increases rather than a decrease in government spending.
JEL classication: E30, E62.
Keywords: optimal scal and monetary rules, scal consolidation, deep habits.
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1 Introduction
Both the ecacy of a scal stimulus and the appropriate speed of scal consolidation are controversial
issues in applied macroeconomics. Of course they are closely related. On the former, the range of empirical
government spending multipliers is wide  Ramey (2011a) surveys the literature and argues that this is
between 0.8 and 1.5  and the sign of the eect on private consumption is controversial. In fact, one strand
of the empirical literature, using methods along the lines of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and more recently
Ramey (2011b), nds evidence for a crowding-out of consumption, while Structural Vector-Autoregressions
(SVARs) in the spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and more recently Monacelli et al. (2010) provide
evidence for a crowding-in eect. In addition, scal multipliers are found to be signicantly higher in a
recession regime (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Batini et al., 2012, among others).
Canonical Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models typically predict scal multipliers
well below the empirical range and a crowding-out eect on private consumption. The main reason for this
is to be found in the negative wealth eect triggered by the increase in government purchases. This, in fact,
crowds out private consumption and investment and makes output respond in a less than proportional way.
Woodford (2011), through rather simple algebraic manipulations, shows that the government spending
multiplier is (i) necessarily below one in a neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and exactly the
same both in an RBC with monopolistic competition and in a sticky-price New-Keynesian (NK) model with
strict ination targeting; (ii) exactly one in an NK model with xed real interest rate; (iii) somewhere
between the two values in a model featuring a Taylor rule. In general, the more accommodative the
monetary policy, the higher the scal multiplier. On the last point Canova and Pappa (2011) also provide
empirical support. Moreover, substantially larger-than-one multipliers can be obtained in standard NK
models if the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate (ZLB) binds. Christiano et al. (2011) nd that
the spending multiplier may also reach 10 at the ZLB if the scal stimulus lasts for exactly the quarters
when the ZLB is binding.
A modelling device that has been used to obtain the consumption crowding-in and higher scal multi-
pliers in Real Business Cycle (RBC) models is the assumption that external `deep habits' à la Ravn et al.
(2006) are formed in private and public consumption, i.e. habits on the average consumption level of each
variety of goods. Jacob (2011) shows that in a New-Keynesian (NK) model with deep habits, increasing
degrees of price stickiness soften the expansionary eects of a scal stimulus and may overturn the results
obtainable in a RBC model. However, Cantore et al. (2012) show that with an empirically plausible degree
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of price stickiness and either under an `empirical' or an `optimized' interest-rate rule the main results still
hold.
This paper investigates these issues paying particular attention to the subtle interactions between
scal and monetary policy that determine the outcome of scal stimuli and consolidations. We examine
scal-monetary interactions in a NK DSGE model with deep habits, distortionary taxes and a sovereign
risk premium for government debt. A number of possible interest rate and scal policies are compared:
rst, the welfare-optimal (Ramsey) policy; second, a time-consistent policy; third optimized simple Taylor
type rules (of which a price-level rule is a special case of the interest rate rule). For the simple rule both
passive and active scal policy stances are examined. We study policy rules responding both to continuous
future stochastic shocks (policy in `normal times') and to a one-o large shock to government debt (`crisis
management'). This results in what we believe to be the rst assessment of what is the optimal timing
and optimal combination of instruments to achieve a scal consolidation using rules that are also suitable
for future normal times.
Welfare calculations and impulse responses indicate that the ability of the simple rules to closely mimic
the Ramsey optimal policy, observed in the literature with optimal monetary policy alone, is still a feature
of optimal policy with scal instruments, but only with `passive' scal policy. For crisis management we
nd some support for slow consolidation with a more active role for tax increases rather than a decrease
in government spending.
The implications of these results agree with the ndings of a number of recent studies. Batini et al.
(2012) show, in the context of regime-switching vector-autoregressions, that smooth and gradual consoli-
dations are to be preferred to frontloaded or aggressive consolidations, especially for economies in recession
facing high risk premia on public debt. In addition, they nd that tax hikes are less contractionary than
spending cuts. Erceg and Linde (2013) obtain similar ndings in a DSGE model of a currency union.
Denes et al. (2013) highlight limitations of austerity measures, while Bi et al. (2013) show in a DSGE set-
ting that, in the current economic environment, consolidation eorts are more likely to be contractionary
rather than expansionary.
There are a few recent papers that address some of the issues in our paper: using a standard NK model
with government sovereign risk, but without habit of a deep or `supercial' kind, Corsetti et al. (2013)
carry out a comparison of dierent scal consolidation scenarios. Apart from the model with deep habits,
our study diers in that we consider optimal or optimized simple commitment rules whereas their paper
studies ad-hoc policies. Leith et al. (2012) do examine optimal and optimized simple rules in a calibrated
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model with deep habits, but only for normal times. Perhaps the closest paper to ours is Kirsanova and
Wren-Lewis (2012). In a simple core calibrated NK model without habits or a government sovereign risk
their paper examines dierent ad hoc degrees of scal feedback alongside optimal monetary policy. As in
our paper they allow scal policy to become `active' and monetary policy 'passive' (as dened by Leeper
(1991)) leaving the price level to jump to satisfy the government budget constraint. In contrast to all
three studies we compare commitment and discretion, thus drawing conclusions regarding the importance
of the former. Another novel feature of our paper is the consideration of the zero lower bound constraint
for the interest rate in the design of optimal interest rate rules, and we impose an analogous upper bound
constraint on the government debt/GDP ratio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 briey summarizes
the Bayesian estimation of the model drawing upon Cantore et al. (2013a). The main Section 4 carries
out the policy experiments and Section 5 concludes. More technical details and proofs are appended to
the paper.
2 The Model
Building on Cantore et al. (2012) we conduct the analysis within a NK model with Rotemberg price
stickiness and convex investment adjustment costs augmented with deep habit formation. We rene the
scal sector in that the government nances its expenditures by raising a mix of lump-sum and distortionary
taxes and by issuing government bonds. In addition, we allow for a sovereign risk to generate a premium
in the interest payments paid by the government.
2.1 Households
A continuum of identical households j ∈ [0, 1] has preferences over dierentiated consumption varieties
i ∈ [0, 1]. Following Ravn et al. (2006), preferences feature habit formation at the level of individual goods,
or deep habits (see also Jacob, 2011; Di Pace and Faccini, 2012; Zubairy, 2012; Cantore et al., 2013b).
Similar to the more common supercial habits, i.e. habits on the overall level of consumption, deep habits
may be internal or external, although it is common practice to use the latter version as this is analytically
more tractable. In fact, internal deep habits lead to a time inconsistency problem (see Ravn et al., 2006),
so we adopt external deep habits, i.e., keeping up with the Joneses good by good. In the microeconometric
literature there is recent evidence of deep habit formation. For instance Verhelst and Van den Poel (2012)
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estimate a spatial panel model using scanner data from a large European retailer and test for both internal
and external deep habit formation. While they nd some categories with internal habit formation, this
eect is generally small. On the contrary, the external habit eect is always positive and signicant. In the
macro-econometric literature there are also estimates of deep habits for the US. For instance, Ravn et al.
(2006) use a Generalized Method of Moments estimator applied to the consumption Euler equation and
use the additional restrictions that deep habits imply for the supply side of the economy. Zubairy (2013)
estimates the deep habit parameters within the broader setting of a Bayesian estimation of a medium-scale
NK model. Cantore et al. (2013a) compare supercial and deep habit formation within an estimated NK
model for the US and provide empirical support in favour of the latter. Household j's optimization problem
is
max
{(Xct )j ,K
j
t+1,B
j
t+1,I
j
t ,h
j
t}
Et
∞∑
s=0
eBt+sβ
t+sU((Xt+s)
j , 1−Hjt+s),
subject to constraints
(
1 + τCt
)
(Xct )
j +Ωt + I
j
t + τ
L
t +
Bjt
Pt
+
(Bgt )
j
Pt
=
(
1− τWt
)Wt
Pt
Hjt +
(
1− τKt
)
RKt K
j
t
+
Rt−1B
j
t−1
Pt
+
Rgt−1Ψ
−1
t−1
(
Bgt−1
)j
Pt
+
ˆ 1
0
Jitdi, (1)
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)K
j
t + e
I
t I
j
t
[
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)]
, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, eBt is a preference shock, (Xt)
j = X
(
(Xct )
j , Xgt
)
is a composite
of habit-adjusted dierentiated private and public consumption goods and Hjt are hours of work. This
assumption implies that government consumption delivers some utility to private agents (see e.g. Pappa,
2009; Cantore et al., 2012). Many studies, on the contrary, assume that public consumption goods are not
utility-enhancing, i.e. they are simply a waste of resources. The private component of (Xt)
j is
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θ
cScit−1)
1− 1
eP
t
ζ di
] 1
1− 1
eP
t
ζ , (3)
where θc ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of deep habit formation on each variety, ζ is the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution, eP is a price mark-up shock, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of habit in the consumption of
good i, which evolves over time according to
Scit = ϱ
cScit−1 + (1− ϱ
c)Cit, (4)
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where ϱc ∈ (0, 1) implies persistence. The optimal level of demand for each variety, Cjit, for a given
composite is obtained by minimizing total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi over C
j
it, subject to (3). This leads to
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
(Xct )
j + θcScit−1, (5)
where Pit is the price of variety i, and Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−ePt ζ
it di
] 1
1−eP
t
ζ is the nominal price index. Multiplying (5)
by Pit and integrating, real consumption expenditure C
j
t can be written as a function of the consumption
composite and the stock of habit: Cjt = (X
c
t )
j + Ωt, where Ωt ≡ θ
c
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di. Households hold K
j
t
capital holdings, evolving according to (2) where δ is the capital depreciation rate, Ijt is investment,
S(·) represents an investment adjustment cost satisfying S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0, and eIt is an
investment-specic shock. Investment is also a composite of goods, i.e. Ijt =
[´ 1
0
(
Ijit
)1− 1
eP
t
ζ di
] 1
1− 1
eP
t
ζ ,
but does not feature habit formation. Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of
private investment goods for each variety i:
Ijit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
Ijt . (6)
In the budget constraint, τCt , τ
W
t and τ
K
t are tax rates on consumption, labour income and the return
on capital, respectively and τLt is a lump-sum tax. Households buy consumption goods, C
j
t ; invest in
investment goods, Ijt , nominal private bond holdings, B
j
t , and nominal government bond holdings, (B
g
t )
j
;
receive the hourly wage, Wt, the rental rate of capital, R
K
t , the return on nominal private bond holdings,
Rt, the return on nominal government bond holdings, R
g
t , augmented by the sovereign risk premium, Ψt,
and rms' prots,
´ 1
0 Jitdi; and pay a mixture of lump-sum and distortionary taxes.
The rst-order condition (FOC) with respect to (w.r.t.) the private consumption composite (Xct )
j
implies that the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint (1) is equal to Λjt = (1+τ
C
t )U
j
Xc,t,
where U jXc,t is the marginal utility of the private consumption composite. Let Λ
j
tQ
j
t be the multiplier on
the capital accumulation equation (2), and Qjt represent Tobin's Q. Then, the FOC w.r.t. capital, K
j
t+1,
implies Qjt = Et
{
Djt,t+1
[
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Q
j
t+1
]}
, where Djt,t+1 ≡ βEt
[
eBt+1U
j
Xc,t+1
eBt U
j
Xc,t
1+τCt
1+τCt+1
]
is the stochastic
discount factor. The FOC w.r.t. investment, Ijt , yields
eItQ
j
t
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− S′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
+ Et

eIt+1Djt,t+1Qjt+1S′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)2 = 1,
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while the FOCs w.r.t. the private and government bond holdings delivers the following non-arbitrage
condition for the two interest rates
1 = Et
[
Djt,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
]
= Et
[
Djt,t+1Ψ
−1
t
Rgt
Πt+1
]
, (7)
whereΠt ≡
Pt
Pt+1
is the gross ination rate. Finally the FOC w.r.t hours implies: −U jH,t = U
j
Xc,t
(
1− τWt
)
(1+
τCt )
Wt
Pt
.
Equation (7) implies Rgt = ΨtRt, i.e. that the government has to pay a premium, Ψt, on its in-
terest payments. Such sovereign risk premium is modelled as an exponential function of government
indebtedness,Ψt = exp
(
ϕ bt
Yt
)
, where ϕ ≥ 0 is a structural parameter.1
2.2 Government
As in Ravn et al. (2006) deep habits are present also in government consumption. This can be justied by
assuming that households form habits also on consumption of government-provided goods. Alternatively,
as in Leith et al. (2012) and Ravn et al. (2012), one can also argue that public goods are local in nature
and households care about the provision of individual public goods in their constituency relative to other
constituencies. For example, controversies over post-code lotteries in health care and other local services
(Cummins et al., 2007) and comparisons of regional per capita government spending levels (MacKay,
2001) suggest that households care about their local government spending levels relative to those in other
constituencies. Ravn et al. (2012) also propose the idea of procurement relationships that create a tendency
for the government to favour transactions with sellers that supplied public goods in the past. In each period
t, the government allocates spending PtGt over dierentiated goods sold by rms in a monopolistic market
to maximize the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good:
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θ
gSgit−1)
1− 1
eP
t
ζ di
] 1
1− 1
eP
t
ζ ,
1Corsetti et al. (2013) introduce the sovereign default by assuming a scal limit to the government-debt-to-GDP ratio.
Whenever this ratio exceeds this limit a default in the form of a haircut will occur. However, the uncertainty surrounding
the political process of a sovereign default is captured by granting the possibility of extracting such a limit each period from
a probability distribution. In particular, each period, at a given level of indebtness, the ex-ante probability of default is
given by the cumulative distribution function of a generalised beta distribution. With an appropriate calibration, such a
mechanism generates a sovereign risk premium the quantitative eects of which are close to the simpler specication above.
For a data-driven procedure to compute debt limits for advanced economies see Ghosh et al. (2013).
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subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0 PitGitdi ≤ PtGt, where θ
g is the degree of deep habit formation in
government spending and Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for this expenditure, which evolves as:
Sgit = ϱ
gSgit−1 + (1− ϱ
g)Git, (8)
and exhibits persistence ρg. At the optimum
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
Xgt + θ
gSgit−1. (9)
For simulations without a spending rule, aggregate real government consumption, Gt, is an autoregressive
process
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ ϵGt , (10)
where ρG is an autoregressive parameter and ϵ
g
t is a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation
σG.
The government budget constraint in real terms will read as follows:
bgt =
Rgt−1b
g
t−1
Πt(1 + gt)
+
Gt
Yt
−
Tt
Yt
, (11)
where bgt ≡
B
g
t
PtYt
is the debt-GDP ratio, gt ≡
Yt−Yt−1
Yt
and Tt represents total government revenue:
Tt = τ
C
t Ct + τ
W
t wth+ τ
K
t R
k
tK
p
t + τ
L
t .
In order to reduce the number of tax instruments to one, we impose that τCt , τ
W
t , τ
K
t and τ
L
t deviate
from their steady state2 in at by the same proportion (i.e. τCt = τ τ¯
C , τWt = τ τ¯
W , τKt = τ τ¯
K ,τLt = τ τ¯
L)
and that the proportional uniform tax change, τ , becomes one of our scal policy instruments. The other
instrument we consider is government spending Gt. We allow the instruments to be adjusted according to
2The choices of steady-state tax rates and debt are discussed when we come to the policy exercises in Section 4.
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the following Taylor-type rules:
log
(τt
τ¯
)
= ρτ log
(τt−1
τ¯
)
+ ρτB log
(
bgt−1
bg
)
+ ρτY log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ϵτt , if b
g ̸= 0
= ρτ log
(τt−1
τ¯
)
+ ρτB
(
bgt−1 − b
g
)
+ ρτY log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ϵτt , if b
g = 0 (12)
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
− ρGB log
(
bgt−1
bg
)
− ρGY log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ϵGt , if b
g ̸= 0
= ρG log
(τt
G¯
)
− ρGB
(
bgt−1 − b
g
)
− ρGY log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ϵGt , if b
g = 0 (13)
where ρτ implies persistence in the tax instrument, ρτB is the responsiveness of the tax instrument to
the deviation of government debt from its steady state, and ρτY is the responsiveness to the percentage
deviation of the output gap. Parameters ρG, ρGB, and ρGY are the analogues in the expenditure rule,
while ϵτt and ϵ
G
t are mean zero, i.i.d. scal shocks with standard deviations σ
τ and σG, respectively.
Notice that these are Taylor-type rules as in Taylor (1993) that respond to deviations of output and debt
from their deterministic steady state values and not from their exi-price outcomes. Such rules have
the advantage that they can be implemented using readily available macro-data series rather than from
model-based theoretical constructs (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)). As reported below, a similar
modelling choice is made for the monetary policy interest rate rule.3
2.3 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive rms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] rents capital, Kit, and hires
labour, Hit to produce dierentiated goods Yit with convex technology F (AtHit,Kit), where At is a
labour-augmenting technology shock, which are sold at price Pit. Firms face quadratic price adjustment
costs ξ2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)2
Yt, as in Rotemberg (1982)  where parameter ξ measures the degree of price stickiness
 and maximize the following ow of discounted prots:
Jit = Et


∞∑
s=0
Dt,t+s

 Pit+sPt+s (Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s)
−Wit+s
Pt+s
Hit+s −R
K
t+sKit+s −
ξ
2
(
Pit+s
Pit+s−1
− 1
)2
Yt



 ,
3In the context of a NK model with deep habits, Cantore et al. (2012) compare simple interest-rate rules embedding the
model-based denition of the output gap to rules employing deviations of output from the steady state. They nd that when
the two types of rule are designed to be optimal, they result in almost identical real and ination outcomes, though by means
of dierent interest-rate paths.
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with respect to Kpit+s, H it+s, Cit+s, S
c
it+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s and Pit+s subject to (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), and the
rm's resource contraint
Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s = F (Hit,Kit)− FC = Yit, (14)
where FC are xed production costs, set to ensure that the free entry condition of long-run zero prots is
satised. The corresponding rst-order conditions for this problem are:
RKt =MCtFK,it,
Wt
Pt
=MCtFH,it,
νct ,=
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− ϱ
c)λct ,
λct = EtDt,t+1(θ
cνct+1 + ϱ
cλct+1),
νgt =
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− ϱ
g)λgt ,
λgt = EtDt,t+1(θ
gνgt+1 + ϱ
gλgt+1),
Pit
Pt
(Cit +Git)− ξ
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)
Pit
Pit−1
Yt + (1− e
P
t ζ)
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ePt ζ
It + e
P
t ζMCt
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
It
−ePt ζν
c
t
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
Xct − e
P
t ζν
g
t
(
Pit
Pt
)
−ePt ζ
Xgt + ξEtDt,t+1
[(
Pit+1
Pit
− 1
)
Pit+1
Pit
]
Yt+1 = 0.
Variables MCt, ν
c
t , λ
c
t , ν
g
t , λ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (14), (5), (4), (9)
and (8) respectively. In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents the rm's real
marginal cost. Let MCnt denote the nominal marginal cost. The gross mark-up charged by nal good rm
i can be dened as µit ≡ Pit/MC
n
t =
Pit
Pt
/
MCnt
Pt
= pit/MCt, where pit =
Pit
Pt
. In the symmetric equilibrium
all nal good rms charge the same price, Pit = Pt, hence the relative price is unity, pit = 1. It follows
that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost.
2.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is set according to a Taylor-type interest-rate rule:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ϵMt , (15)
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where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter and ρpi and ρy are the monetary responses to ination
and output relative to its steady state, and ϵMt is a mean zero, i.i.d. monetary policy shock with standard
deviation σM .
2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear. The model is completed by the resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
Yt +
χ
2
τ2t Yt, (16)
and the following autoregressive processes for exogenous shocks:
log
(
eκt
e¯κ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt
e¯κ
)
+ ϵκt ,
where (16) includes both price change costs and the cost of tax collection, κ = {B,P, I, A}, ρκ are
autoregressive parameter and ϵκt are mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation σ
κ.
2.6 Functional forms
The utility function specializes as U(Xt, 1−Ht) =
[
X
(1−ϱ)
t (1−Ht)
ϱ
]1−σc
−1
1−σc
, where σc > 0 is the coecient of
relative risk aversion, and ω is a preference parameter that determines the relative weight of leisure and the
consumption composite in utility. The consumption composite is a CES aggregate of private and public
consumption, Xt =
{
ν
1
σx
x (Xct )
σx−1
σx + (1− νx)
1
σx (Xgt )
σx−1
σx
} σx
σx−1
, with νx representing the share of the
private component in the aggregate and σx being the elasticity of substitution between the private and the
public component. Investment adjustment costs are quadratic: S
(
It
It−1
)
= γ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, γ > 0, while
the production function is Cobb-Douglas: F (Ht,Kt) = (AtHt)
αK1−αt , where α represents the labour
share of income.
3 Bayesian Estimation
The model was estimated by Bayesian methods using US quarterly data for 6 observables (output, con-
sumption, investment, government spending, nominal interest rate and ination) over the period 1984:Q1-
2008:Q3.
A number of structural parameters are kept xed in the estimation procedure, in accordance with
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the usual practice in the literature (see Table 1). This is done so that the calibrated parameters reect
steady state values of the observed variables. An important parameter for the policy exercises is ϕ which
determines the sovereign risk premium. Online Appendix A sets the calibration of ϕ. In the policy
assessment we do not wish to underestimate the importance of the constraint imposed on scal authorities
by nancial markets. We therefore choose a value of ϕ at the upper end of the possible range. Another
important parameter for welfare analysis is νx in the household utility. This is set so that the calibration
of the government spending ratio, G
Y
= 0.2, is optimal from the viewpoint of atomistic households. This
is discussed further in Online Appendix B.
Estimation results from posteriors maximization are presented in Tables 2-3. We used the same priors
as Smets and Wouters (2007) for common parameters whereas we used the estimates of Ravn et al. (2006)
for the Deep habits parameters.
Calibrated parameter Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.9902
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Labour share α 0.70
Substitution elasticity of goods ζ 5.3
Fixed cost FC 0.13095
ES between leisure and consumption ϱ 0.8640
Share of private consumption over total consumption νx 0.7662
Tax collection parameter χ 0.05
Risk premium parameter ϕ 0.01
Implied steady state relationship
Hours H 0.33
Government expenditure-output ratio gy 0.2
Consumption-output ratio cy 0.6203
Investment-output ratio iy 1− gy − iy
Tax collection costs - output ratio χτ
2
2Y 0.01
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
The estimation results are presented below4
4Full details are presented in Cantore et al. (2013a).
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parameter prior mean post. mean 5% CI 95% CI Prior prior stdev
ρA 0.5 0.9812 0.9682 0.9957 beta 0.2
ρG 0.5 0.9311 0.8929 0.9685 beta 0.2
ρZI 0.5 0.3640 0.1452 0.5671 beta 0.2
ρB 0.5 0.7972 0.6670 0.9378 beta 0.2
ρP 0.5 0.4997 0.1652 0.8285 beta 0.2
εA 0.1 1.3487 1.0097 1.6951 invg 2.0
εG 0.5 0.7793 0.6808 0.8732 invg 2.0
εZI 0.1 2.7415 1.7539 3.9920 invg 2.0
εP 0.1 0.1015 0.0215 0.2241 invg 2.0
εM 0.1 0.0759 0.0507 0.0995 invg 2.0
εB 0.1 1.2952 0.9563 1.6334 invg 2.0
Table 2: Posterior results for the exogenous shocks
parameter prior mean post. mean 5% CI 95% CI Prior prior stdev
γ 2 1.9802 1.0632 2.8989 norm 1.5
σc 1.5 1.3734 0.8193 1.9131 norm 0.3750
ϱC 0.8 0.8380 0.7090 0.9530 beta 0.10
θC 0.8 0.7047 0.6127 0.7981 beta 0.10
ϱG 0.8 0.9129 0.7914 0.9949 beta 0.10
θG 0.8 0.6760 0.5085 0.8388 beta 0.10
σx 0.999 0.7034 0.4620 0.9437 gamma 1.00
ξ 25.300 25.2331 23.5999 26.8421 norm 1.00
ρpi 1.5 1.8337 1.5104 2.1494 norm 0.25
ρr 0.75 0.8529 0.8049 0.9023 beta 0.1
ρy 0.25 0.0338 0.0015 0.0657 norm 0.05
Table 3: Posteriors results for model parameters
4 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Stabilization Policy
We consider two aspects of monetary and scal optimal stabilization policy. The rst is stabilization policy
for `normal times '. Rules are then designed to minimize an expected conditional welfare loss starting at
some steady state. In this case the optimal policy problem is purely stochastic: optimal policy is in
response to all future stochastic shocks hitting the economy. By contrast, `crisis management ' starts with
the economy far from the steady state (for whatever reason) so that policy is then required both for the
economy to return to the steady state (a deterministic problem) and for it to deal with future stochastic
shocks (the stochastic problem).
For both problems we adopt a linear-quadratic (LQ) set-up which, for a given set of observed policy
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instruments wt, considers model linearized around a steady state in a general state-space form:

 zt+1
Etxt+1

 = A

 zt
xt

+Bwt +

 ut+1
0

 (17)
where zt, xt are vectors of backward and forward-looking variables, respectively, wt is a vector of policy
variables, and ut is an i.i.d. zero mean shock variable with covariance matrix Σu.
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Let yTt ≡ [zt xt wt]. Our balanced-growth steady state is that of the non-linear deterministic Ramsey
problem. Then following the general procedure set out in Online Appendix C, a welfare-based quadratic
large-distortions approximation to expected welfare loss at time t, Et[Ωt], where
Ωt =
1
2
(1− β)
∞∑
i=0
βt[yTt+τQyt+τ ] (18)
where Q is a matrix. With the LQ approximation the normal and crises aspects of policy conveniently
components decompose, but one optimal policy emerges conditional on the initial point.
In the absence of a further constraints, the policymaker's optimization problem at time t = 0 is to
minimize Ω0 given by (18) subject to (17) and given z0. If the variances of shocks are suciently large,
there are two problems with the solution to this LQ problem. The rst is that the variance the debt/GDP
ratio bt/Yt may be very high, even with a sovereign risk premium. The second is that this will lead to a
large nominal interest rate variability and the possibility of the nominal interest rate becoming negative.
We defer considerations of the latter zero-lower bound problem until section 4.2. Here we consider the
former problem.
4.1 Debt-GDP Upper Bound Considerations
We pose the problem as in terms of a high probability of violating an upper bound constraint on the
debt-GDP ratio (for example 100%). Using discounted averaging, recalling bgt ≡
B
g
t
PtYt
, dene b¯g ≡
E0
[
(1− β)
∑
∞
t=0 β
tbgt
]
to be the discounted future average of the debt-GDP path {bgt } at t = 0. Our
`approximate form' of the upper bound constraint is a requirement that b¯g is at least kb standard devia-
tions below an upper bound bound for bgt given by b
g
ub. The constraint is then b
g
ub − b¯
g ≥ kbsd(b
g
t ) which
5Lower case variables are dened as deviations about the balanced growth steady state; for a typical variable Xt, xt ≡
logXt/Xt where Xt is the balanced growth steady state.
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squaring becomes
(bgub − b¯
g)2 ≥ k2b
[
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt(bgt − b¯
g)2
]
(19)
Lemma
A sucient condition for this constraint is that the following two constraints are satised
E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt(bgt )
2
]
≤ m
bgub
1 + k2b
− b¯g ≥ Kb
where Kb = max
[
0,
kb
1 + k2b
√
m(1 + k2b )− b
2
ub
]
Proof. See Appendix D.
Now write the second constraint as
b¯g ≡ E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtbgt
]
≤
bgub
1 + k2b
−Kb
This means we must add two terms E0(1−β)[wb
∑
∞
t=0 β
t(bgt )
2+µb
∑
∞
t=0 β
tbgt ] = wbE0(1−β)
∑
∞
t=0 β
t(bgt +
µb
2wb
)2− a constant, where wb, µb > 0 are Lagrange multipliers, to the Lagrangian of the optimization
problem. Dening bt = b
g
t − b
g, it follows now that the eect of the two extra constraints is to replace the
single period loss function with
y
T
t Qyt + wb(b
g
t + b
∗)2 (20)
where the role of the Lagrange multiplier is taken over by −b∗, an asset accumulation requirement for the
scal authority (relative to the initial steady state). The upper bound constraint can then be achieved by a
combination of raising wb and lowering the variance of the debt-income ratio, and lowering its steady-state
thereby making room for a higher variance without violating the constraint.
There are two possible ways of treating the steady state. The rst is normative and seeks a quadratic
approximation about the steady state of the Ramsey problem without upper bound considerations. Then
with our choice of functional form for the risk premium, the steady state debt-income ratio bg = 0 and
ruling out the availability lump-sum taxes (which would be optimal to use exclusively) the tax rates τC ,
τW and τK are computed in the Ramsey problem. However we adopt a second approach which is to
choose empirical values for these tax rates and a pre-crisis debt-to-GDP ratio bg = 0.60. This enables
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us to examine policy in the current scal environment that doesn't call for radical changes in the tax
structure and accumulation of government assets. Then following Christiano et al. (2010): τC = 0.05,
τW = 0.24, τK = 0.32. The lump-sum tax τL is then set equal to 0.0641 in order to target bg = 0.60 and
b∗ in (20) becomes a debt-GDP target found computationally so that the Ramsey problem with the scal
instrument as the uniform change to all tax rates, τt, and b
g
t gives the required steady state. With this
steady state and an upper bound debt-income ratio of bub = 1, a choice of wb = 0.001 in (20) results in an
extremely low probability of violating the upper bound constraint, certainly far lower than the threshold
we set later for the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate.
4.2 Policy for Normal Times
In this section we examine optimal policy using both monetary and scal instruments. As in Cantore
et al. (2012) `optimality' can mean the welfare-optimal (Ramsey) policy, or time-consistent policy or
optimized Taylor-type interest rate and scal rules.|6 For the latter we compare the use of either our
taxation instrument τt alone or in conjunction with government spending Gt according to rules (12) alone
or together with (13). Monetary policy is conducted according to (15).
One can think of this choice of rules as assigning responsibility for stabilizing ination and debt to
the monetary authority and scal authorities respectively.7 With both the interest rate and the scal
instruments responding to uctuations of output the two authorities are sharing responsibility for output
uctuations.
The assignment issue arises in a dierent form in Leeper (1991) who provides the original character-
isation of policy rules as being `active' or `passive'. An active monetary policy rule is one in which the
monetary authority satises the Taylor principle in that they adjust nominal interest rates such that real
interest rates rise in response to excess ination. Conversely, a passive monetary rule is one which fails to
satisfy this principle. In Leeper's terminology a passive scal policy is one in which the scal instrument is
adjusted to stabilize the government's debt stock, while an active scal policy fails to do this. Our simple
rules allow for both these possibilities.8
6The LQ solutions for these three policy regimes are now standard - see, for example, Levine et al. (2007) for details.
Regarding discretionary policy, recent important contributions by Blake and Kirsanova (2012) and Dennis and Kirsanova
(2013) raise the possibility of multiple discretionary equilibria. These are of two types: point-in-time, which give multiple
responses of the private sector to a given policy rule and those arising from more than one discretionary policy. The iterative
algorithm we use rules out the former. The latter can in principle be found by experimenting with dierent initializations;
however for the model and loss function employed in this paper we have not been able to nd more than one equilibrium.
7For a recent discussion of the assignment issue see Kirsanova et al. (2009).
8Cochrane (2011) proposes passive scal rules to avoid the arbitrary assumption of a non-explosive path for the price level
needed in the standard Blanchard-Kahn RE solution. But Sims (2013) points out that introducing a very small feedback
from ination to the tax-rate, together with ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate and an upper bound on government
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For simple rules we impose two `feasibility' constraints (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)): ρrpi ≤ 5
and ρτB, ρGB ≤ 0.25 to avoid threat of excessive changes in the interest rate, tax rate and government
spending.9 Table 4 sets out the welfare outcomes under our three policy regimes with the optimized
feedback parameters for the simple rule. For the latter we allow for both passive and active scal policy.
These are implemented by constraining the parameter ρrpi to be greater (the Taylor principle) or less
than unity respectively. The welfare loss is reported in brackets as a consumption equivalent percentage
increase below the optimal policy, ce.
10
To allow us to assess their separate contributions to stabilization, four possible combinations of policy
instruments are considered. First we consider all instruments together. Then focusing only on simple
commitment rules, we switch o the use of government spending and taxation changes separately keeping
these scal instruments at their steady state values. Finally we consider `monetary policy alone'. Then
for the case of active scal policy the model is saddlepath-stable and government debt is stabilized with
all instruments held xed at their steady state. But with passive policy a tax instrument is still required
to stabilize government debt; we use taxes with minimal feedback on the debt-income ratio.
A number of features from these results stand out. First, with all three instruments the gains from
commitment amount to ce = 0.03% and almost all such gains can be achieved by an optimized simple rule
with passive scal policy. An optimized rule with active scal policy by contrast is hardly better than
discretion in welfare terms and consists of a constant tax rate. The optimized monetary rule involves no
response to output changes and with a very high degree of persistence is close to a price-level rule.11 Second,
the results from switching o the scal instruments one at a time indicate that government spending is
the more eective scal instrument. Indeed the optimized active scal rule without the use of government
spending sees a substantial welfare loss compared with the fully optimal policy with all instruments of
over a 1% consumption equivalent. Why are tax changes less eective for stabilization purposes? The
asset accumulation, are sucient to rule out such explosive paths.
9In fact ρτB , ρGB ≤ 0.25 is the minimal feedback for either instrument separately to stabilize the government debt-income
ratio.
10To derive the welfare in terms of a consumption equivalent percentage increase. (ce ≡
∆C
C
×102), expanding U(Xt, 1−Nt)
as a Taylor series, ∆U = UC∆C = CMU
Cce × 10
−2. Losses X reported in the Table are of the order of variances expressed
as percentages and have been scaled by 1 − β. Thus X × 10−4 = ∆U and hence ce =
X×10−2
CMUC
. For the steady state of this
model, CMUC = 0.503. It follow that a welfare loss dierence of X = 1 gives a consumption equivalent percentage dierence
of ce ≈ 0.02%.
11There has been a recent interest in the case for price-level rather than ination stability. Gaspar et al. (2010) provide an
excellent review of this literature. The basic dierence between the two regimes in that under an ination targeting mark-up
shock leads to a commitment to use the interest rate to accommodate an increase in the ination rate falling back to its
steady state. By contrast a price-level rule commits to a ination rate below its steady state after the same initial rise. Under
ination targeting one lets bygones be bygones allowing the price level to drift to a permanently dierent price-level path
whereas price-level targeting restores the price level to its steady state path. The latter can lower ination variance and be
welfare enhancing because forward-looking price-setters anticipates that a current increase in the general price level will be
undone giving them an incentive to moderate the current adjustment of its own price.
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reason must be the existence of tax distortions in the model and the more direct demand channel oered
by government spending in our NK model. Third, with monetary policy alone and active scal policy
all three tax instruments are held xed at their steady states. Then it is left entirely to the price level
to stabilize the economy and government debt in particular in the face of shocks. As a consequence the
volatility of ination is very high as seen in the impulse responses, discussed below. This regime leads to
the highest possible variances and welfare costs of ce = 1.11% so we can conclude that this is a measure of
the maximum cost of business cycle uctuations. Finally, apart from the case of simple rules with active
scal policy, the standard deviation of the nominal interest rates are high indicating a zero lower bound
problem. This we return to in a later sub-section. However even with a steady-state debt-GDP ratio at
60%, the upper end required in the Euro-zone, and an upper bound of 100%, the standard-deviations
reported in Table 5 with wb set at a low value wb = 0.001 implies a very low probability of exceeding this
upper bound.
Figures 1-8 show the impulse responses to a 1% increase in the technology, mark-up, investment and
preference shocks respectively. For each shock we rst display the impulse responses for all policy regimes.
For these, the fully optimal commitment rule and the optimized simple rule with passive scal policy are
very close, so in a second gure we focus only on these two.
We see the familiar impulse responses in a NK model across all three monetary policy regimes. For a
technology shock output immediately rises and, ination falls. The optimal policy is to commit to a sharp
monetary relaxation before gradually returning to the steady state. Both consumption and leisure rise
(the latter a familiar result in the NK literature) and hours fall. The productivity shock results in a fall
in the mark -up, a rise in the real wage, the real marginal cost and ination rises under optimal and time
consistent policy. Consumption and investment rise, the latter in response to a fall in the real interest
rate. Real variables - output, hours and consumption dier little between optimal and time consistent
policy for all shocks, which explains the small welfare dierences in Table 4 for all shocks combined. For
a (negative) mark-up shock (a shock to the elasticity parameter ζ) output, consumption, investment,
hours rise. Ination and the nominal interest change by very little and in a fashion consistent with the
Taylor rule. The investment shock causes output and hours to rise but crowds out consumption. In all
these responses the optimized simple rule with passive scal policy closely mimics the fully optimal policy,
conrming the welfare outcomes in Table 4.
If government spending does not react to public debt and real output deviations, in Figures 9 and
10 we can explore a scal stimulus through an exogenous impulse to government spending of size one
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Policy Mix Rule [ρr, ρrpi, ρry] [ρτ , ρτB , ρτy] [ρG, ρGB , ρGy] Loss (ce)
All Instruments Optimal not applicable not applicable not applicable 1.98 (0)
All Instruments Time Cons not applicable not applicable not applicable 3.43 (0.03)
All Instruments Simple (PF) [0.91, 5.00, 0.00] [0.15, 0.25, 0.36] [0.39, 0.25, 0.39] 2.19 (0.004)
All Instruments Simple (AF) [0.00, 0.00 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.44, 0.00, 0.50] 2.80 (0.02)
Rt, Tt; Gt = G Simple (PF) [1.00, 5.00, 0.00] [0.62, 0.25, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] 4.16(1.04)
Rt, Tt; Gt = G Simple (AF) [0.00, 0.00 0.00] [0.85, 0.00, 0.02] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] 53.3 (1.02)
Rt, Gt; Tt = T Simple (PF) [0.89, 5.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.57, 0.25, 0.25] 2.26 (0.006)
Rt, Gt; Tt = T Simple (AF) [0.05, 0.00 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.44, 0.00, 0.50] 2.81 (0.02)
Rt; min Tt, Gt = G Simple (PF) [1.00, 5.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.25, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] 4.43(0.05)
Rt; min Tt, Gt = G Simple (AF) [0.00, 0.00 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] 57.7 (1.11)
Table 4: Optimal Interest Rate, Taxation and Government Spending Rules: Welfare Outcomes.
The welfare loss is reported as a consumption equivalent percentage increase above the optimal policy.
percent. With the tax rule in place, this increase in government spending is nanced by a combination of
distortionary and non-distortionary tax.
An increase in aggregate demand as such acts as a scal stimulus - in fact with G
Y
= 0.2 in the steady
state the impact multiplier is well over unity in our estimated model and almost identical across all policy
regimes.12 Ination falls initially because the estimated degree of deep habits makes aggregate supply
initially shift more than aggregate demand, but then rises, which elicits an interest rate initial rise but
then a fall, again for all regimes. In our model with deep habits we see the familiar result in the literature
highlighted in our introduction that a scal stimulus causes the mark-up to decrease, the real wage to rise
and a crowding in of consumption. For a (negative) mark-up shock (a shock to the elasticity parameter
ζ) output, consumption, investment, hours rise. Ination and the nominal interest change by very little
and in a fashion consistent with the Taylor rule. The investment shock causes output and hours to rise
but crowds out consumption.
4.3 Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound Considerations
Table 5 indicates that the aggressive nature of these rules leads to high interest rate variances resulting in
a ZLB problem for all the rules. From the table with our zero-ination steady state and nominal interest
rate of 1% per quarter, optimal policy variances between 1.00 and 1.49 of a normally distributed variable
imply a probability per quarter of hitting the ZLB in the range [0.14, 0.22]. At the upper end of these
ranges the ZLB would be hit almost every year. In this subsection we address this issue.
As for the upper bound on the debt-GDP ratio, we can impose a lower bound eect on the nominal
12Note that Figures 9 and 10 depict impulse response functions (irf) to a shock to government spending of size one percent
and the scal multiplier is given by ∆Yt
∆Gt
= Yt
Gt
× irf.
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Policy Mix Rule sd(Yt) sd(Πt) sd(ht) sd(Ct) sd(Rt) sd(τt) sd(Gt) sd(
B
4Y
)
All Instruments Optimal 9.14 0.13 0.81 7.89 1.49 2.67 9.46 6.40
All Instruments Time Cons 9.20 0.28 1.27 7.84 1.00 13.3 9.14 14.3
All Instruments Simple (PF) 8.88 0.13 1.34 7.69 0.47 2.31 9.07 9.84
All Instruments Simple (AF) 8.47 0.29 1.92 7.66 0 0 7.50 0.77
Rt, Tt; Gt = G Simple (PF) 7.02 0.12 2.46 3.68 0.42 8,80 0 14.0
Rt, Tt; Gt = G Simple (AF) 6.47 3.99 7.94 6.00 0 0 0 11.9
Rt, Gt; Tt = T Simple (PF) 8.65 0.13 1.46 7.86 0.46 0 7.69 5.03
Rt, Gt; Tt = T Simple (AF) 8.47 0.29 1.92 7.66 0 0 7.50 0.77
Rt; min Tt, Gt = G Simple (PF) 8.73 0.12 4.91 16.1 0.43 96.6 0 445
Rt; min Tt, Gt = G Simple (AF) 6.47 3.97 7.94 6.01 0 0 0 12.0
Table 5: Optimal Interest Rate, Taxation and Government Spending Rules: Volatility Outcomes
interest rate by modifying the discounted quadratic loss criterion as follows.13 Consider rst the ZLB
constraint on the nominal on the nominal interest rate. Rather than requiring that the gross rate Rt ≥ 1
for any realization of shocks, we impose the constraint that the mean gross rate should at least k standard
deviation above the ZLB. Again, for analytical convenience we use discounted averages.
Dene R¯ ≡ E0
[
(1− β)
∑
∞
t=0 β
tRt
]
to be the discounted future average of the nominal interest rate
path {Rt}. Our `approximate form' of the ZLB constraint is a requirement that R¯ is at least kr standard
deviations above the zero lower bound; i.e., using discounted averages that
R¯ ≥ krsd(Rt) = kr
√
R2 − (R¯)2 (21)
Squaring both sides of (21) we arrive at
E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtR2t
]
≤ Kr
[
E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtRt
]]2
(22)
where Kr = 1 + k
−2
r > 1
Again, as in upper bound debt-income ratio considerations, we can write this as two sucient con-
13This follow the treatment of the ZLB in Woodford (2003) and Levine et al. (2008a)
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straints
E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtR2t
]
≤ m
E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtRt
]
≥
√
m
Kr
which is equivalent to adding E0(1−β)[wr
∑
∞
t=0 β
tR2t +µr
∑
∞
t=0 β
tRt] = wrE0(1−β)
∑
∞
t=0 β
t(Rt−
µr
2wr
)2−
a constant, where wr, µr > 0 are Lagrange multipliers, to the Lagrangian of the optimization problem.wr
It follows that the eect of the extra constraint is to follow the same optimization as before, except that
the single period loss function of log-linearized variables is replaced with
Lt = y
T
t Qyt + wr(rt − r
∗)2 (23)
where rt ≡ log
Rr
R
and r∗ is a nominal interest rate target for the constrained problem relative to the
steady state.
In our LQ approximation of the non-linear optimization problem we have linearized around the Ramsey
steady state which has zero ination. With a ZLB constraint, the policymaker's optimization problem is
now to choose an unconditional distribution for rt, shifted to the right by an amount r
∗, about a new
positive steady-state ination rate, such that the probability of the interest rate hitting the lower bound
is extremely low. This is implemented by choosing the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that
z0(p)σr < R(Π) − 1 where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable Z such
that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, R(Π) = ΠR(1) is the shifted nominal gross interest rate corresponding to a gross
ination rate Π (all in the steady state). Then given σr the steady state positive gross ination rate that
will ensure Rt ≥ 1 with probability 1− p is given by
Π∗ = max
[
z0(p)σr + 1
R(1)
, 1
]
(24)
In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss at time t = 0
as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = Ω˜0 + Ω¯0. By increasing wr we can lower σr
thereby decreasing π∗ ≡ Π∗− 1 (the net shifted ination rate) and reducing the deterministic component,
but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss. By exploiting this trade-o,
we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes a ZLB constraint,
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Rt ≥ 1 with probability 1− p. Figures 11  13 and Table 6 show this solution to the problem for all three
policy regimes with p = 0.0025; ie., a very stringent ZLB requirement that the probability of hitting the
zero lower bound is only once every 400 quarters or 100 years.
Rule [ρr, ρrpi, ρry] [ρτ , ρτB , ρτy] [ρG, ρGB , ρGy] Adjusted Loss (ce) wr π
∗ sd(Rt)
Optimal not applicable not applicable not applicable 2.09 (0.00) 0.006 0 0.36
Time Cons not applicable not applicable not applicable 6.08 (0.08) 0.005 0.1 0.37
Simple (PF) [1.00, 1.76, 0.00] [0.51, 0.25, 0.07] [0.63, 0.00, 0.23] 2.28 (0.002) 0.007 0 0.33
Simple (AF) [0.00, 0.00 0.00] [0.00, 0.00, 0.00] [0.39, 0.00, 0.50] 3.40 (0.03) 0 0 0
Table 6: Imposing the Zero Lower Bound with All Instruments.
In this analysis it is important to stress that the extra term in the welfare criterion for the nominal
interest rate only exists to impose the relevant constraints. After computing optimal policy when we
come to reporting the welfare loss this extra contribution is removed in the numbers reported to give an
`adjusted' loss.
From Table 6 we observe rst, that the imposition of the ZLB constraint increases the gains from
commitment, in fact it doubles from ce = 0.04% to ce = 0.08%.
14 Second the aggressive response of the
nominal interest rate in the optimized simple rule with passive scal policy seen previously with no ZLB
considerations now gives way to a far more restrained stance. The interest rate regime now becomes a
pure price level rule on which we have commented. Finally, alongside the stochastic stabilization bias of
discretion we now see a deterministic steady-state inationary bias of 0.1% per quarter.
Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit; then the interest
rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936).
Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) )15
in eect replaces it with a nominal interest rate variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever
hit. By contrast the work of a number of authors including Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland
(2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with
commitment in the face of a non-linear constraint Rt ≥ 1 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity
traps in the form of Rt = 1. But it is open to question whether the solution methods in these papers
are adequate for models as large as that of this paper. For deterministic and stochastic simulations of
linearized DSGE models for a given policy rule, Holden and Paetz (2012) provide a particularly ecient and
14See Levine et al. (2008a) for further discussion of this result.
15As in Levine et al. (2008a), we generalize the treatment of these authors however by allowing the steady-state ination
rate to rise. Our policy prescription has recently been described as a dual mandate in which a central bank committed to
a long-run ination objective suciently high to avoid the ZLB constraint as well as a Taylor-type policy stabilization rule
about such a rate - see Blanchard et al. (2010) and Gavin and Keen (2012).
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implementable algorithm for general inequality constraints and a very useful assessment of this literature.
4.4 Crisis Management of High Debt: How Fast, How Deep?
Finally we examine the question of how fast should a scal consolidation proceed. To examine this we
subject the model to a further initial unanticipated debt shock. First we decompose the state vector zt in
deviation form about the deterministic steady state into deterministic and stochastic components:
zt = z¯t︸︷︷︸
deterministic
+ z˜t︸︷︷︸
stochastic
and similarly for xt and the instruments wt = w¯t+ w˜t Then exploiting the LQ strucure of the problem the
expected quadratic welfare loss can be expressed as Et[Ωt] = Ω¯t + Et[Ω˜t] and the optimal policy design
decomposes into
A: Min Ω¯t wrt w¯t → deterministic expected path
and
B: Min Et[Ω˜t] wrt w˜t → stochastic state-contingent path or rule
We have already considered problem B (policy for normal times). Now we turn to problem A where the
policymaker is faced with an initial increase in the debt-GDP ratio. We examine a 20% increase which is
still suciently small for the linearization to be valid, but large enough to be of interest. We use the rules
designed to avoid hitting the interest rate ZLB set out in Table 6. Figures 14 and 15 show the simulation
results.
These four sets of trajectories provide the expected responses of output, consumption etc to the unan-
ticipated debt shock. If the policymaker chooses to continue with the state-contingent simple rules designed
for normal times in response to future technology, mark-up, investment and preference shocks she would
announce a consolidation programme that follows one of the simple rules. But in this deterministic ex-
ercise there is no reason why she should not instead follow the trajectory of the optimal policy, as long
as commitment is credible (policy A) and use the rule B for any unexpected deviation about this path
(policy B).
Three features of our results then stand out: rst, there appears to be some support for slow consolida-
tion, in response to high initial debt. Along the optimal trajectory the debt to income ratio falls at the rate
of around 1% per year. Second, this consolidation is achieved using tax increases rather than a decrease
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in government spending. Third, if the government lacks commitment or must stick with the active scal
rules the optimal speed of scal consolidation is much faster. The simple rules with active scal policy
are particularly striking. A debt shock brings about a substantial increase in the price level to stabilize
the debt-GDP ratio. This acts as a large supply-side shock with output, consumption, the real wage and
hours working rising sharply. As a consequence the debt falls quickly. Since this particular rule dominates
the graph, Fig 15 removes it and focuses on the simple passive scal rule alongside optimal policy. These
responses are more plausible. Optimal policy promotes some initial output growth which gives way to
austerity. Taxes rise substantially along with some more modest fall in government spending. Debt falls
very slowly. Unlike normal times, the optimized simple rules falls short of mimicking the performance of
the optimal policy for debt reduction, but the optimal rate of decline of debt remains slow.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined scal-monetary interactions in a NK DSGE model with deep habits, distortionary
taxes and a sovereign risk premium for government debt. As shown in Cantore et al. (2012) deep habits
crucially aect the scal transmission mechanism in that it leads to a counter-cyclical mark-up even when
prices are exible. This feature boosts the size of a output expansion or contraction with important
consequences for optimal monetary and scal policy.
We proceed to use the model in conjuction with the Bayesian estimates of Cantore et al. (2013a) to
compute optimal monetary and scal policy rst in `normal times' with debt at its steady state and then in
a crisis period with a much higher initial debt-GDP ratio. For the former, we nd that both taxation and
government spending scal instruments alongside monetary policy, the gains from commitment amount
to a consumption equivalent of ce = 0.03% and almost all such gains can be achieved by an optimized
simple rule with passive scal policy. An optimized rule with active scal policy by contrast is hardly
better than discretion in welfare terms and consists of a constant tax rate. The optimized monetary rule
involves no response to output changes and, with a very high degree of persistence, is close to a price-level
rule. By switching o the scal instruments one at a time we nd that government spending is the more
eective scal instrument in welfare terms. With monetary policy alone and active scal policy all three
tax instruments are held xed at their steady states. This provides a measure of the maximum cost of
business cycle uctuations which turns out to be over 1% in consumption equivalent terms. Apart from
the case of simple rules with active scal policy, the standard deviation of the nominal interest rates are
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high indicating a zero lower bound problem which we address by modifying the optimization problem and
the subsequent monetary rule.
For crisis management, scal consolidation should be slow unless the scal authority cannot commit,
or must stick with an active scal simple rule. For the former case optimal consolidation is best achieved
using tax increases and should proceed slowly at a rate of approximately 1% of debt-GDP per year. Thus
an economy that sets out with an initial debt-income ratio of 100% to achieve a requirement of 60%
should allow 40 years, clearly much slower than envisaged in current austerity programmes in Europe and
elsewhere.
Two priorities for future research seem apparent. First in this paper we have adopted the standard
information assumptions - perfect information on the part of the private sector, but a limited use of data
by the econometrician. Elsewhere we have highlighted these inconsistent and implausible information
assumptions (Levine et al. (2012)). It would be of interest to see if our results remain intact under infor-
mational consistency. Second, our model assumes full employment so if anything we are underestimating
the cost of consolidation. We plan to revisit all the issues and experiments in this paper using a model
with search-match labour market frictions as set out in Cantore et al. (2013b).
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ONLINE APPENDICES
A Calibration of the Sovereign Risk Premium Parameter φ
In order to calibrate the sovereign risk premium, we assume the debt-to-GDP being one at the steady
state such that the gross steady-state sovereign spread is simply Ψ = exp(ϕ). Hence given a yearly net
spread, spread, the associated ϕ for our quarterly model is ϕ = log
(
1 + spread4
)
. In the table below we
report the parameter values ϕ takes at dierent levels of the sovereign spread.
Yearly spread (basis points) Quarterly net spread (spread/4) ϕ
0 0.00000 0.00000
50 0.00125 0.00054
100 0.00250 0.00108
200 0.00500 0.00217
300 0.00750 0.00325
400 0.01000 0.00432
500 0.01250 0.00540
Table 7: Calibration of the sovereign risk premium
B Optimal Choice of Government Spending and Calibration of νx
Consider the RBC core of the model without a nominal dimension. Then the social planner's deterministic
problem at time t = 0 is to allocate consumption, hours, output, investment, capital stock and government
spending over time so as to maximize
∑
∞
t=0 β
tUt(Xt, Ht) subject to a resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (B.1)
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where
Xt =
{
ν
1
σx
x [X
c
t ]
σx−1
σx + (1− νx)
1
σx [Xgt ]
σx−1
σx
} σx
σx−1
(B.2)
Xct = Ct − θ
cSct−1 (B.3)
Sct = ϱ
cSct−1 + (1− ϱ
c)Ct (B.4)
Xgt = Gt − θ
gSgt−1 (B.5)
Sgt = ϱ
gSgt−1 + (1− ϱ
g)Gt (B.6)
Yt = F (Ht,Kt)− FC (B.7)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
(B.8)
To perform this optimization set up the Lagrangian
L0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Ut(Xt, Ht) + µ1,t[Yt − Ct − It −Gt] (B.9)
+ µc2,t[X
c
t − Ct + θ
cSct−1] + µ
c
3,t[S
c
t − ϱ
cSct−1 − (1− ϱ
c)Ct] (B.10)
+ µg2,t[X
g
t −Gt + θ
gSgt−1] + µ
g
3,t[S
g
t − ϱ
gSgt−1 − (1− ϱ
g)Gt] (B.11)
+ µ4,t
[
Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 − It
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]]
(B.12)
+ µ5,t[Yt − F (Ht,Kt) + FC]
]
(B.13)
We are interested only in the allocation between private and public consumption given hours, invest-
ment, capital stock and therefore output. The rst-order conditions relevant for this problem are:
Xct : UXc,t + µ
c
2,t = 0 (B.14)
Ct : −µ1,t − µ
c
2,t − µ
c
3,t(1− ϱ
c) = 0 (B.15)
Sct−1 : β
−1µc3,t−1 − ϱ
cµc3,t + θ
cµc2,t = 0 (B.16)
Xgt : UXg ,t + µ
g
2,t = 0 (B.17)
Gt : −µ1,t − µ
g
2,t + µ
g
3,t(1− ϱ
g) = 0 (B.18)
Sgt−1 : β
−1µg3,t−1 − ϱ
gµg3,t + θ
gµg2,t = 0 (B.19)
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It follows that the dierence between the composite private and public marginal consumption is given by
UXc,t − UXg ,t = µ
g
2,g − µ
c
2,t = −µ
g
3,t(1− ϱ
g) + µc3,t(1− ϱ
c) (B.20)
This result contrasts with the choice of the atomistic household who takes the stocks of habit as exogenous
and therefore ignores the two constraints in habit putting µg3,t = µ
c
3,t = 0. Thus UXc,t = UC,t = UXg ,t =
UG,t holds and is individually optimal for this case giving an allocation for which the household would vote.
We use this condition to calibrate the preference parameter νx. However it is not the correct condition for
the social optimum in the presence of external habit.
The steady state of (B.14)-(B.19) is given by
UXc + µ
c
2 = 0 (B.21)
−µ1 − µ
c
2 − µ
c
3(1− ϱ
c) = 0 (B.22)
µc3 − βϱ
cµc3 + βθ
cµc2 = 0 (B.23)
UXg + µ
g
2 = 0 (B.24)
−µ1 − µ
g
2 − µ
g
3(1− ϱ
g) = 0 (B.25)
µg3 − βϱ
gµg3 + βθ
gµg2 = 0 (B.26)
(B.27)
Some algebraic manipulation then leads to
UXc − UXg = µ
c
2 − µ
g
2 =
µc2(1− ϱ
c)βθc
(1− βϱc)
−
µg2(1− ϱ
g)βθg
(1− βϱg)
(B.28)
so the social planner's allocation coincides with that chosen by the atomistic household (µc2 = µ
g
2) i
(1− ϱc)θc
(1− βϱc)
=
(1− ϱg)θg
(1− βϱg)
(B.29)
This condition holds if deep habit parameters are the same for private and public consumption (our priors),
but otherwise will only hold by extreme coincidence.
Finally note that the steady-state allocation of the social planner's inter-temporal problem is not the
same as the optimum of the steady-state inter-temporal utility. The latter is found by maximizing U(X,H)
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subject to
X =
{
ν
1
σx
x [X
c]
σx−1
σx + (1− νx)
1
σx [Xg]
σx−1
σx
} σx
σx−1
(B.30)
Xc = C − θcSc (B.31)
Sc = C (B.32)
Xg = G− θgSg (B.33)
Sg = G (B.34)
Y = F (H,K)− FC (B.35)
K = δ−1I (B.36)
The two problems only coincide if β = 1 in which case (B.29) becomes simply θc = θg.
The Ramsey problem for the NK model adds the nominal side determining prices, given the monetary
instrument, and ination costs to the resource constraint. This however does not change the public-private
consumption problem which remains as before.
An interesting implication of the non-optimality of the steady state of the inter-temporal problem is
that once it is reached it is not optimal to stay there. In general, the solution to the social planner's problem
starting from some arbitrary initial conguration of the economy is only ex ante optimal  anywhere along
the trajectory (including the nal steady state) there exists an incentive to re-optimize. This is just
another way of saying that the solution to the social planner's problem is time-inconsistent and the same
applies the the Ramsey problem. An implication of all this is that even if we calibrate preferences such
that the observed G/Y is consistent with the steady state of the social optimum then a spending shock
can immediately increase or decrease the inter-temporal utility as observed in our simulations. In fact
our calibration imposes UC,t = UG,t which is only individually optimal and then it turns out that an AR1
negative spending shock increases welfare despite lowering output. But all these depends on the relative
strength of deep habit for private and public consumption.
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C The Hamiltonian Quadratic Approximation of Welfare
Suppose we have a deterministic dynamic optimization problem expressed in the form16
max
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Xt−1,Wt) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt) (C.1)
given initial and possibly tranversality conditions, which has a steady state solution X¯, W¯ for the states Xt
and the policies Wt. Dene xt = Xt − X¯ and wt =Wt − W¯ as representing the rst-order approximation
to deviations of states and policies from their steady states.
The Lagrangian L for the problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(Xt−1,Wt)− λ
T
t (Xt − f(Xt−1,Wt))] (C.2)
so that a necessary condition for the solution to (C.1) is that the Lagrangian is stationary at all {Xs}, {Ws}
i.e.
UW + λ
T
t fW = 0 UX −
1
β
λTt−1 + λ
T
t fX = 0 (C.3)
These necessary conditions for an optimum do not imply that the there is an asymptotic steady state to
(C.3). However for the purposes of this paper, let us assume that this is the case, so that a steady state λ¯ for
the Lagrange multipliers exists as well. Now dene the Hamiltonian Ht = U(Xt−1,Wt) + λ¯
T f(Xt−1,Wt).
The following is the discrete time version of Magill (1977a):
Theorem 1: If a steady state solution (X¯, W¯ , λ¯) to the optimization problem (C.1) exists, then for
any small initial perturbation x0 about X¯, the solution to the problem
max
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
xt−1 wt
] HXX HXW
HWX HWW



 xt−1
wt

 s.t. xt = fXxt−1 + fWwt
where HXX , etc denote second-order derivatives evaluated at (X¯, W¯ ), has the same stability properties
16This Appendix closely follows Levine et al. (2008b). An alternative representation of the problem is U(Xt,Wt) and
Et[Xt+1] = f(Xt,Wt) where Xt includes forward-looking non-predetermined variables and Et[Xt+1] = Xt+1 for the deter-
ministic problem where perfect foresight applies. Whichever one uses, it is easy to switch from one to the other by a simple
re-denition. Magill (1977a) adopted a continuous-time model without forward-looking variables. We present a discrete-time
version with forward-looking variables. As we demonstrate in the paper, although the inclusion of forward-looking variables
signicantly alters the nature of the optimization problem, these changes only aect the boundary conditions and not the
steady state of the optimum which is all we require for LQ approximation.
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as the solution to (C.1).
Judd (1998), (page 506) thus identies this as the LQ approximation to the problem (C.1). The
reason why this result holds is because the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to Xt and Wt are
zero when evaluated at (X¯, W¯ , λ¯). By denition,
∑
∞
t=0 β
tU(Xt−1,Wt) =
∑
∞
t=0 β
t[U(Xt−1,Wt)− λ¯
T (Xt−
f(Xt−1,Wt))], and the rst-order term of the Taylor series expansion of the latter expression is zero.
Although we deal directly with forward-looking systems in Theorem 3(b) below, we note that the above
theorem applies both to backward-looking engineering-type systems and to rational expectations (RE)
systems, in that approximation is about the long run of the optimum. However in the case of RE, the
conventional optimum is obtained as a time-inconsistent solution, but the LQ approximation can also be
used to obtain the timeless perspective optimum.
For the result of theorem to hold (X¯, W¯ , λ¯) must satisfy (C.3). These, it should be stressed, are nec-
essary but not sucient conditions for a local maximum. A standard sucient condition for optimality
is that the functions f(X,W ) and U(X,W ) are concave, but this is rarely satised in examples from
economics. A more useful sucient condition is the following:
Theorem 2: A sucient condition for for the steady state of (C.3) to be a local maximum is that
the matrix of second derivatives of H in (C) is negative semi-denite17.
This condition is easy to check, but in the event that it does not hold, the following discrete time
version of the sucient conditions for an optimum in Magill (1977b) is applicable when the constraints
and/or the welfare function are non-concave. It is based on iterating on the quadratic approximation
to the value function. Part (a) below is a standard result, and relates to the fact that one requires a
second-order condition to be met for the policy variables. Part (b), which is the main theoretical result of
this paper, extends part (a) to the case when there are forward-looking variables.
Theorem 3:
(a) Case with no forward-looking variables: A necessary and sucient condition for the solution
(C.3) to the dynamic optimization problem (C.1) to be a local maximum is that βfTWPtfW +HWW is neg-
ative denite for all t, where the matrices fX , fW , HXX , HXW , HWW are all evaluated along the solution
17A simple example of a problem for which a maximum exists, but for which this sucient condition does not hold is: max
x2 − y2 such that y = ax+ b. It is easy to see that the stationary point is a maximum when |a| > 1.
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path and Pt satises the backwards Riccati equation given by:
Pt−1 = βf
T
XPtfX − (βf
T
XPtfW +HXW )(βf
T
WPtfW +HWW )
−1(βfTWPtfX +HWX) +HXX (C.4)
and the value function of small perturbations xt about the path of the optimal solution dynamic optimiza-
tion problem is given by 12x
T
t Ptxt.
(b) Case with forward and backward-looking variables: Consider a rational expectations sys-
tem, where we order Xt as predetermined followed by non-predetermined variables, so that the latter
dynamic constraints involve forward-looking expectations. Suppose that there is a long-run steady state
solution to the rst-order conditions. Then a further necessary and sucient condition for this to be a max-
imum is that the bottom right-hand corner P22 of the the steady-state Riccati matrix P is negative denite.
Proof of Theorem
The basic idea is that the the optimal policy depends on the initial condition and the instruments and, in
the case of an RE system, the jumps in the non-predetermined variables. Given the latter, one can take
a dynamic programming approach to the problem to prove (a): taking variations about the optimal path,
one may write the value function Vt at time t as a constant plus
1
2x
T
t Ptxt. Using (C), one can write the
value function Vt−1 (ignoring constants) as
Vt−1 =
1
2
max
{
β(fXxt−1 + fWwt)
TPt(fXxt−1 + fWwt) +
[
xt−1 wt
] HXX HXW
HWX HWW



 xt−1
wt

} (C.5)
with respect to wt. The stated conditions for a maximum, and the update of Pt are straightforward to
derive from this.
To prove (b), recall that from Currie and Levine (1993), we have the result under RE that V0 is given
by 12(x
pT
0 (P11 − P12P
−1
22 P21)x
p
0 + p
T
0 P
−1
22 p0) where x
p
t are the deviations in the predetermined variables,
p0 is the initial value of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-predetermined variables (and
is the source of the time inconsistency problem), and P =

 P11 P12
P21 P22

 is written conformably with
predetermined and non-predetermined variables respectively. Clearly if P−122 is not non-negative denite,
then the value of V0 can be set arbitrarily large by appropriate choice of p0; in such a case, a solution to
the problem which tends to a steady state optimum does not exist.
As mentioned above we assume the existence of a steady state solution to (C.3) given by [X¯, W¯ , λ¯],
since we are interested in approximations about the latter. Hence the matrices in (C.4) (apart from Pt) are
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constant. Thus this theorem provides a means of checking whether a candidate solution to (C.3) actually
is optimal. Note that the perturbed system is in standard linear-quadratic format, which is the basis for
this result.18
Using these results our general procedure for approximating the non-linear optimization problem by a
LQ one is as follows:
1. Set out the deterministic non-linear problem for the Ramsey Problem, to maximize the representative agents'
utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
2. Write down the Lagrangian for the problem.
3. Calculate the rst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for an optimum since we
ultimately only need the steady-state of the Ramsey problem.
4. Calculate the steady state of the rst-order conditions. The terminal condition implied by this procedure is
such that the system converges to this steady state.
5. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the Hamiltonian associated
with the Lagrangian in 2.
6. Calculate a rst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the rst-order conditions and
the original constraints.
7. Use 4. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 5. By appropriate elimination both the
Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal form. This then gives us the accurate LQ
approximation of the original non-linear optimization problem in the form of a minimal linear state-space
representation of the constraints and a quadratic form of the utility expressed in terms of the states.
8. In an LQ procedure for computing ex ante optimal policy in stochastic setting compute the following
two necessary and sucient conditions for a particular steady state of the rst order conditions to
be a local maximum:
(a) Condition 1: βfTWPtfW +HWW is negative denite
(b) Condition 2: P22 is negative denite.
If these conditions are satised then proceed to time consistent and optimized simple rules
18Levine et al. (2008b) show that Magill (1977a)'s result easily extends to the stochastic case as well.
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APPENDIX FOR PUBLICATION
D Proof of Lemma
The constraint is then bgub − b
g ≥ kbsd(b
g
t ) which squaring becomes
(bgub − b
g)2 ≥ k2b
[
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt(bgt − b
g)2
]
= k2b ( (b
g)2 − (bg)2) (D.1)
dening
bg ≡ E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtbgt
]
(D.2)
(bg)2 ≡ E0
[
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt(bgt )
2
]
(D.3)
Completing the square, (D.1) can be written as

 bub√
1 + k2b
−
√
1 + k2b b
g

2 + b2ubk2b
1 + k2b
≥ k2b (b
g)2 (D.4)
Then a little algebra shows that the two constraints in the lemma are sucient to satisfy (D.4).
37
0 10 20
−0.2
0
0.2
Inflation
0 10 20
0
1
2
Output
0 10 20
−2
−1
0
Nominal Interest
0 10 20
−2
0
2
Government Debt/4GDP
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
Consumption
0 10 20
−5
0
5
Tax Rate
0 10 20
0
2
4
Investment
0 10 20
−2
0
2
Mark−up
0 10 20
0
2
4
Real Wage
0 10 20
−1
0
1
Hours
0 10 20
0
0.5
1
Gov Spending
0 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
Fiscal Deficit/Y
 
 
Optimal TCT Simple (Passive Fiscal) Simple (Active Fiscal)
Figure 1: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Technology Shock
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Figure 2: IRFs for Optimal Monetary Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Technology Shock
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Figure 3: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Mark-up Shock
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Figure 4: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Mark-up Shock
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Figure 5: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation Rules and Government Spending Rules. Investment Shock
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Figure 6: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation Rules and Government Spending Rules. Investment Shock
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Figure 7: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Preference Shock
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Figure 8: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Preference Shock
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Figure 9: IRFs for Optimal Monetary and Taxation Rules. Fiscal Stimulus
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Figure 10: IRFs for Optimal Monetary and Taxation Rules. Fiscal Stimulus
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Figure 11: Imposition of ZLB for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules Rules
43
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x 10−3Weight
 
pi*
σ
r
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
x 10−3
0
5
10
15
20
25
Weight w
r
W
el
fa
re
 L
os
s 
 
 
Welfare LossTotal
Welfare LossDeterministic
Welfare LossStochastic
Figure 12: Imposition of ZLB for Time Consistent Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules
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Figure 13: Imposition of ZLB for Simple Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules with Passive
Fiscal Policy
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Figure 14: IRFs for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Debt Shock
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Figure 15: IRFs for for Optimal Monetary, Taxation and Government Spending Rules. Debt Shock
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